NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/SR.1

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

24 July 2006

Original: English

Main Committee I

Summary record of the 1st meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 19 May 2005, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Parnohadiningrat ..... (Indonesia)

Contents

Organization of work

General exchange of views

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent *within one week of the date of this document* to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza.

Any corrections to the record of this meeting and of other meetings will be issued in a corrigendum.

06-30668 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

Organization of work

1. **The Chairman** drew attention to the proposed programme of work contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/INF.1 and made an oral revision to it.

2. *The programme of work, as orally revised, was adopted.*

General exchange of views

3. **Mr. Kayser** (Luxembourg), speaking on behalf of the European Union; the acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania; the candidate countries Croatia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process countries Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro; and, in addition, Norway, introduced working paper NPT/CONF.2005/WP.43, entitled "Working paper based on the European Union statement for Main Committee I".

4. **Mr. Rivasseau** (France) said that his Government had greatly contributed to the global efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament and had reaffirmed its commitments under article VI of the Treaty. His Government was guided, in particular, by the programme of action adopted at the 1995 Review Conference, including with respect to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).

5. His Government had renounced nuclear testing and had acceded to the CTBT. France had dismantled its testing centre in the Pacific, and no longer had any nuclear testing facilities. His Government regretted that the CTBT had still not entered into force. France had also abandoned the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Following its announcement that it had ceased to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons, his Government had decided in February 1996 to close and dismantle its Pierrelatte and Marcoule facilities. The ongoing dismantling of the facilities was a long, complex and costly process, which would stretch over many years. France was alone among the nuclear Powers to have taken such steps.

6. France had advocated launching negotiations on an FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament. Pending signature of such a treaty, his delegation called on all States concerned to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons.

7. France had also contributed greatly to the reduction of nuclear weapons in general. His Government based its nuclear deterrence policy on the principle of strict sufficiency. It had reduced the number of its delivery systems by two thirds since 1985. Further details on other disarmament efforts could be found in the brochure entitled "Lutte contre la prolifération, maîtrise des armements, et désarmement: l'action de la France".

8. France supported the ongoing efforts to bring about a global reduction in nuclear arsenals, especially the process launched by the United States of America and the Russian Federation. France had always underlined the considerable imbalance between the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and the United States of America and its own such force. If the imbalance was redressed by successive reductions, his Government could envisage responding accordingly. In addition, France planned to contribute technically and financially to the Russian plutonium disposal programme within the framework of the agreement currently being negotiated within the multilateral plutonium disposition group.

9. In accordance with article VI of the NPT, his Government made efforts in all areas of general and complete disarmament, including with respect to biological and chemical weapons, small arms and light weapons and mines.

10. With respect to negative security assurances, his Government's doctrine of deterrence strictly linked its nuclear weapons to the safeguard of the vital interests of the nation while ruling out their use as combat weapons to advance a military strategy. Furthermore, the French President had stated that currently no French nuclear deterrent forces were aimed at a specific target. France had also given negative security assurances to all States parties to the NPT in a unilateral declaration of 6 April 1995.

11. Finally, one important path to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation lay in the regional approach. Therefore, his Government had supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and

given security assurances to more than 100 States. France was thus a party to the Protocols to the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba Treaties, respectively. It stood ready to make further efforts to support the establishment of more such nuclear-weapon-free zones.

12. In view of the progress achieved to date by nuclear-weapon States since the end of the cold war, thorough discussions on the issue of negative security assurances would be appropriate within the Conference on Disarmament and, above all, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, where States which were not parties to the NPT were represented.

13. During the past two decades, States parties in sufficient numbers to undermine the Treaty had violated their obligations, developed illegal nuclear programmes and made false statements before the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. Their actions and those of the networks that had helped them would have continued had it not been for the common determination to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. For its part, France remained determined to pursue the application of all NPT provisions.

14. **Ms. Sanders** (United States of America) said that on 7 March 2005 President Bush had urged all parties to the NPT to take strong action to confront the threat of non-compliance with the NPT. States parties should work together at the Conference and in the Committee to recognize the amplitude of the problem and to agree on the main principles of their response.

15. The consistent violations by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea before the announcement of its intention to withdraw from the NPT, and its 10 February 2005 assertion that it had manufactured nuclear weapons, had created great instability in North-East Asia and had threatened the NPT regime. States in the region were confronted by a country with a history of provocation and belligerency. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should return expeditiously and without preconditions to the six-party talks and commit to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear programme.

16. Her delegation applauded the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for deciding to meet its NPT obligations. By doing so, it had set an important standard for how countries in violation of their non-proliferation undertakings could voluntarily return to compliance and strengthen global confidence and security.

17. Regrettably, the Iranian regime's long-term secret effort to acquire a fissile material production capability could give the Islamic Republic of Iran nuclear weapons, in violation of its NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards undertakings. The security consequences for the Middle East of that development were grave. Her Government encouraged the Islamic Republic of Iran to respond positively to the call by Germany, France and the United Kingdom to fully suspend and permanently cease all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, to dismantle equipment and facilities related to such activities, to bring into force and implement the Additional Protocol to the NPT, and to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve outstanding questions and meet all IAEA Board of Governors requests. The Islamic Republic of Iran should provide objective and verifiable guarantees in order to demonstrate that it was not using a purportedly peaceful programme to hide a nuclear weapons programme or to conduct additional clandestine nuclear work elsewhere in the country. Her Government shared the desire of European Governments to secure the Islamic Republic of Iran's adherence to its NPT obligations through peaceful and diplomatic means.

18. To fulfil the obligations under article I of the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States must establish and implement comprehensive and effective export controls, including on dual-use items. The nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility as they had had nuclear weapons infrastructures for decades. Given the interest of certain non-nuclear-weapon States and non-State actors in seeking the means to build nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States must effectively protect against theft or unauthorized transfer of technology, equipment and material useful in the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons.

19. Fulfilment of the obligations under article II required non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain from activities designed to develop nuclear weapons capability. Further, they should provide sufficient transparency in their activities to demonstrate their peaceful purpose and should have in place the necessary laws and regulations to enforce their article II obligations.

20. NPT supplier States, both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States, should not authorize the export of any nuclear-related item unless they were satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. When in doubt about a possible diversion risk, it was best to forgo the export. By doing so, NPT supplier States could avoid inadvertently assisting a possible future NPT violator to acquire capabilities useful for a nuclear weapons programme. If a State had violated the NPT's non-proliferation obligations, then all nuclear cooperation with that State should terminate.

21. The revelations associated with the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear procurement network had made clear that all States must be vigilant to prevent their territories from being used to further nuclear weapons acquisition. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2005), all States must establish effective national legal and regulatory measures to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials. Full implementation of the resolution by all States would strengthen enforcement of articles I and II of the NPT.

22. Another activity that could help to ensure that parties to the NPT did not inadvertently assist a State to acquire nuclear weapons was to take action against an illegal export during the transport phase. States should take cooperative action to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking. The Proliferation Security Initiative could play an important role in preventing nuclear items from reaching State or non-State actors of nuclear proliferation concern.

23. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism would help to strengthen the international legal framework to combat nuclear terrorism upon its entry into force. Her Government strongly supported the ongoing effort to include non-proliferation transport offences and a shipboarding regime which complemented the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. That effort would significantly expand the international legal basis to impede, prosecute and punish persons or entities involved in the maritime transport of proliferation-related shipments.

24. To strengthen the article II ban on the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, States parties must have strong declaratory policies that established the necessity of compliance with the NPT. They should also seek to halt the use of nuclear material or equipment acquired or produced by a State party as a result of a material violation of NPT undertakings. Such items should be eliminated or returned to the original supplier. States parties should affirm their willingness to report cases of non-compliance with article II to the Security Council. The Council should act promptly in such circumstances to determine a response, particularly where international peace and security were threatened.

25. Any lifting of punitive measures must be strictly linked to verifiable actions and be phased in over a period of time. Among the actions that must be taken by the non-compliant party was the full implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol. Moreover, States parties were fully justified in insisting on certain limits in the offender's future nuclear programme, even after it had returned to full compliance.

26. Finally, States parties should understand that the prohibition in article II against the manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear weapon could apply to more than just an assembled nuclear weapon. In an extreme case, a State party might have manufactured an entire mock-up of the non-nuclear shell of a nuclear explosive while continuing to observe its safeguards obligations on all nuclear material. It would be folly for States parties to fail to act in such circumstances. Whether or not there had been a safeguards violation under article III, it was also important to determine whether all the facts of a case pointed towards an intent to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. Examples of activities of concern included: seeking certain fuel cycle facilities of direct relevance to nuclear weapons, such as enrichment or reprocessing, with no clear economic or peaceful justification; clandestine facilities and procurements; committing safeguards violations and failing to cooperate with the IAEA to remedy them; and using denial and deception tactics to conceal nuclear-related activities.

27. The Islamic Republic of Iran had sought to acquire an enrichment programme in secret and in violation of its safeguards obligations under the NPT. In the light of the willingness of another State to provide fuel for the Bushehr reactor and any future reactor, the Islamic Republic of Iran's enrichment programme had no conceivable civil purpose. Moreover, its uranium reserves were too small to

provide an independent fuel supply for its nuclear power programme, but large enough to support a weapons programme. It was painfully clear that the Islamic Republic of Iran was determined to acquire an enrichment plant to give itself the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, which it could pursue either through further violation of or withdrawal from the NPT. The intent of those activities was therefore the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in violation of article II.

28. The NPT should be an essential element of international efforts to create a global environment hostile to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It would lose much of its effectiveness if States parties were not strongly committed to compliance with non-proliferation undertakings under the NPT and to strong action against those who were not.

29. **Mr. Aboul-Einein** (Egypt) said that Egypt had adopted the working papers on the substantive issues to be considered by Main Committee I (WP.18) and on nuclear disarmament (WP.27). In order to reaffirm the place of NPT as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime, strong political will was needed from all parties. Negative regional and international developments affected the credibility and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Treaty had entered into force 35 years previously and had been extended indefinitely in 1995, but its goals were still far from being achieved.

30. Nuclear-weapon States were still delaying the full implementation of their obligations. NPT was merely an intermediate step towards the higher goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons under effective and stringent international monitoring within a short, clearly stated time frame. The 2000 Review Conference had recommended a number of practical steps to implement the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States must fully implement those measures, since failure to do so affected the credibility of the Treaty and reinforced the widespread notion that it strengthened the status of the nuclear-weapon States while placing more constraints on the non-nuclear-weapon States, which violated both the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

31. While NPT was one of the most successful disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, two key elements prevented the achievement of the Treaty's goals. The first was that three States, namely, Israel, India and Pakistan, remained outside of the Treaty, thereby preventing the achievement of the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation and posing an obstacle to the universalization of the regime. The second was the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to disarm in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, despite the end of the cold war and the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and the decisions of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

32. The continuation of strategic policies that relied on nuclear weapons and offered new justifications for their continued possession and development was a matter of concern, since to continue along that path would undermine the credibility of the Treaty. Efforts aimed at concluding an international convention that contained clear and binding commitments on the negative security guarantees that nuclear-weapon States must make to non-nuclear-weapon States must also be supported and accorded the highest priority in the work of the Committee.

33. Regional and international nuclear disarmament were essential, since genuine regional and international security and stability were impossible to achieve as long as there were nuclear weapons. Egypt was disappointed at the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and to begin negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference should adopt a programme of action providing for immediate negotiations on such a treaty.

34. Egypt was concerned at efforts to limit the scope of negotiations on the drafting of a treaty to prohibit the manufacture of fissile materials. The Conference should clearly and objectively review the extent to which nuclear-weapon States were fulfilling their NPT obligations and promptly begin multilateral negotiations on disarmament that included both the five nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States.

35. Nuclear-weapon States should implement the principles of irreversibility, transparency, and

accountability with regard to their nuclear arsenals as well as measures to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weapons, including the creation of additional investigatory capabilities.

36. The issue of complete compliance with the provisions of the Treaty posed major challenges. Egypt had repeatedly emphasized that all of the Treaty's provisions were binding on all parties, in all conditions, and at all times. True compliance meant the reciprocal implementation of obligations by all States parties, whether nuclear or non-nuclear. Questions remained about the so-called "nuclear sharing" in the context of existing military alliances to determine the extent to which it was in violation of or in compliance with articles I and II of the Treaty.

37. Egypt attached great importance to awareness-raising and education in the fields of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and, together with a number of other States, it had participated in the preparation of the working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education (WP.30).

38. **Mr. Hu** Xiaodi (China) said that preservation and strengthening of the NPT through the faithful implementation of all of its articles by all States parties were vital for meeting common security challenges. Over the years, China had strictly implemented its nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT.

39. China stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of relevant international legal instruments to that end. It had pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States under any circumstances. It had signed and ratified relevant protocols to the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba Treaties and hoped that the parties concerned could reach an early agreement on the outstanding questions related to the Bangkok Treaty and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. China stood ready to sign the relevant protocols to those Treaties. It called upon all nuclear-weapon States to renounce the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons, to pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies. China had never taken part in the nuclear arms race nor deployed nuclear weapons abroad. Instead, it had contributed to the international nuclear disarmament process by unilaterally assuming the above-mentioned international obligations.

40. The key to international arms control and disarmament lay in breaking the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament. China supported the Conference's efforts to reach consensus on the programme of work based on the "Five Ambassadors' Proposal" so as to begin substantive work at an early date on nuclear disarmament, a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. It called upon the parties concerned to demonstrate the necessary political will.

41. China supported the early entry into force of the CTBT and was committed to ratifying the Treaty at an early date. It actively supported and participated in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization.

42. Efforts to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space and to advance nuclear disarmament were mutually reinforcing. The deployment of weapons systems in outer space would disrupt the global strategic balance and stability and provoke arms races, including nuclear ones. Such a scenario should not be allowed to become a reality. To that end, China, the Russian Federation, and other countries had consistently supported the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of an international legal agreement on the prohibition of deployment of weapons in outer space, and of the threat or use of force against objects in outer space.

43. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference outlined a number of principles and measures concerning nuclear disarmament. The reduction of nuclear weapons should be effectively verifiable, irreversible and legally binding. Nuclear disarmament measures, including intermediate measures, should promote international strategic stability, preserve security for all, and foster the promotion of international peace and security. Those principles should be reflected in the Final Document of the 2005 Review Conference.

44. Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual reduction towards a lowered balance. States possessing the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals bore special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should

therefore take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals and in making their reduction commitments legally binding. All nuclear weapons removed from their arsenals should be destroyed rather than stored.

45. China favoured intermediate measures towards the goal of nuclear disarmament and was ready to consider implementing relevant measures at the appropriate time and under the appropriate conditions.

46. In order to promote nuclear disarmament, reduce the danger of nuclear war and diminish the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy, nuclear-weapon States should abandon policies of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons and on lowering the threshold for their use. They should also honour their commitment not to target their nuclear weapons against any countries, nor to list any countries as targets of a nuclear strike. All nuclear-weapon States should pledge that at no time and under no circumstances would they be the first to use nuclear weapons, or to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and should conclude appropriate international legal instruments to that end. States should withdraw and repatriate all nuclear weapons deployed outside their own territories, abandon "nuclear umbrella" and "nuclear sharing" policies and practices, and refrain from developing easy-to-use low-yield nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States should take all necessary steps to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons.

47. The Chinese delegation hoped that the ideas contained in the working paper on nuclear disarmament and reduction of the danger of nuclear war (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.2) could be reflected in the report of the Committee and in the final document of the Conference.

48. China believed that fostering a security concept based on mutual trust and benefit, equality and cooperation and on the creation of a favourable international environment were conducive to nuclear disarmament. It would continue to work with the international community towards the lofty goal of eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons and ridding the world of such weapons.

49. **Mr. Mine** (Japan) said that the NPT was a key instrument for achieving global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. To bolster the regime, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike must fulfil their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and promote both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

50. His delegation recalled States parties' obligations under article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on disarmament measures; their commitment to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; and the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons, one of the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 Conference.

51. Japan commended the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and encouraged both the Russian Federation and the United States of America to work towards its full implementation. His delegation called upon all nuclear-weapon States to take further steps towards nuclear disarmament in a transparent and irreversible manner, including deeper reductions in all types of nuclear weapons.

52. Japan attached great significance to the early entry into force of the CTBT, which had been an integral part of the package of decisions adopted at the 1995 Review Conference to allow for the indefinite extension of the NPT. Japan called upon the remaining 11 countries whose ratification was necessary for the Treaty's entry into force to sign and ratify it without delay. Moratoriums on nuclear weapons testing should be continued pending the entry into force of the Treaty. Efforts to develop the CTBT verification regime, including the international monitoring system, should also be continued.

53. The conclusion of an FMCT would be a crucial element in efforts aimed at the total elimination of nuclear arsenals and contribute to the prevention of nuclear proliferation. It would also serve as an effective tool in dealing with the terrorist threat. His delegation noted with regret the ongoing impasse at the Conference on Disarmament and failure to begin negotiations on an FMCT, despite the commitments made at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. The current Review Conference must send a clear message underlining the importance of beginning negotiations immediately. Japan called upon all nuclear-weapon States and States which were not parties to the NPT to declare moratoriums on the production of fissile

material for any nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of an FMCT.

54. The failure of India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the NPT was a matter of serious concern. They should be urged to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay, to refrain from acts that violated the Treaty, and to implement practical measures towards disarmament and non-proliferation. His delegation drew attention to the working paper entitled "Further measures to be taken for strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.21).

55. Japan attached the utmost importance to disarmament and non-proliferation education and had submitted a working paper entitled "Japan's Efforts in Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education" (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.31). Furthermore, Japan, jointly with Egypt, Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland and Sweden, had submitted to the current Review Conference a working paper which contained concrete recommendations for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.30).

56. The international community should be fully aware of the inhumane nature of nuclear weapons. All States parties should undertake concrete activities to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/59/178 and Add.1 and 2) and to share information on the efforts they had been undertaking to that end.

57. 2005 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the tragedies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There were strong voices among the citizens of Japan and the international community affirming that such devastation should never be repeated and that nuclear weapons should be abolished. His delegation called on all States parties to renew their commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

58. **Mr. Agam** (Malaysia), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the NPT, said that the Group remained fully committed to its obligations undertaken under the Treaty and to the agreements reached at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. He introduced working paper NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, entitled "Substantive issues to be considered by Main Committee I of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", which reaffirmed the Group's position on three issues within the purview of the Committee: nuclear disarmament; nuclear testing; and security assurances. It also contained recommendations for consideration by the Committee, which would help greatly to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.

59. The Group of Non-Aligned States had called for the establishment of two subsidiary bodies, one on nuclear disarmament, to focus on fulfilment of the obligations under article VI, and the other on security assurances, to consider legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States. The Group had nevertheless joined the consensus, in the spirit of compromise, on the proposals put forward by the President to establish a single subsidiary body, on nuclear disarmament and security assurances. It was the understanding of the Group that the subsidiary body would focus on the fulfilment of the obligation under article VI of the Treaty and the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 NPT Review Conference and consider legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States.

60. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that the Committee had the opportunity to make a significant contribution to the strengthening of nuclear disarmament. The 2000 NPT Review Conference had made it clear that, as in the case of other weapons of mass destruction, the elimination of nuclear weapons was a milestone on the road to general and complete disarmament.

61. The commitment made by nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals had confirmed his delegation's long-held view that the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States was only temporary. Those States had agreed to 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament, which constituted a solemn reaffirmation of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

62. The international community was increasingly concerned that nuclear-weapon States were not doing enough to achieve nuclear disarmament and, in some areas, were reversing the gains made by the Treaty regime. That situation was exacerbated by a tendency to reinterpret, negate or withdraw from the obligations undertaken at previous conferences. The NPT was a credible multilateral framework for enhancing nuclear

disarmament. The concept of multilateralism should inform the international community's approaches to the Treaty.

63. The lack of political will had been a serious impediment to nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States continued to reject any proposed language within multilateral forums calling on them to implement their nuclear disarmament obligations. In general, nuclear-weapon States had systematically opposed all attempts to be involved in a substantive engagement on nuclear disarmament in the NPT preparatory process, the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament.

64. Any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States was incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security. Continuous and irreversible progress in nuclear disarmament and other related nuclear arms control measures remained fundamental to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the guarantee that they would never be produced again therefore remained the only assurance against their use.

65. The lack of progress on security assurances was yet another cause of great concern to his delegation. South Africa would continue to reiterate its call for negotiations on a legally binding instrument on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT which could be in the form either of a separate agreement reached in the context of the NPT or of a protocol to the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States must fully respect their existing commitments on security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States.

66. The development of new types of nuclear weapons or rationalizations for their use contradicted the spirit of the NPT and went against the agreement reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference for a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies. The modernization of nuclear weapons raised concerns that nuclear testing might be resumed, which would have a negative impact on international peace and security. His delegation therefore favoured maintaining the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, pending the early entry into force of the CTBT.

67. His delegation regretted that the emphasis by some States on non-proliferation appeared to be an attempt to curtail the inalienable right of States parties to use nuclear technology for verifiable peaceful purposes. It would be unfair to place more restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon States' access to nuclear technology without genuine movement towards nuclear disarmament.

68. The crisis threatening the NPT could be avoided if nuclear-weapon States acknowledged the necessity of accelerating implementation of the 13 practical steps. All States parties must fully comply with their commitments on the subjects of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and must refrain from acting in any way that might lead to a new nuclear arms race.

69. **Mr. Sardenberg** (Brazil) said that global security depended on the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they would never be produced or used again. In 2000, his delegation had welcomed the reiteration by nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. It noted with regret, however, that progress by nuclear-weapon States on the path to nuclear disarmament had fallen short of expectations.

70. Brazil, which welcomed both unilateral and bilateral disarmament measures, regarded the Treaty of Moscow as a positive step. Nevertheless, his Government remained concerned about the overall modest progress in reducing nuclear arsenals and considered that the principles of transparency, international verification and irreversibility must be applied.

71. The reaffirmation of security doctrines that continued to rely on nuclear weapons, and the ongoing reluctance of nuclear-weapon States to extend unconditional, legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States, were disturbing, while indications of interest in the development of new kinds of nuclear weapons were of even greater concern. The aforementioned situation had eroded confidence in the NPT-based regime.

72. The pursuit of nuclear disarmament was also necessary to alleviate the international community's

concern about proliferation. Disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing processes requiring progress on both fronts. Progress in nuclear disarmament was all the more important in a world in which non-State actors might seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the international community's focus must be on systematic, continuous and progressive efforts to implement the obligations contained in article VI.

73. The following points, which would facilitate the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, should be given due consideration. First, the Conference should undertake a thorough review of the implementation of the 2000 NPT Final Document, in particular the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, and reaffirm the need for their further implementation. Secondly, the Conference should call for the prompt entry into force of the CTBT and the expeditious negotiation, in the Conference of Disarmament, of a verifiable fissile material treaty. Thirdly, the Conference should send a strong message that the development of new kinds of nuclear weapons was incompatible with the commitments to nuclear disarmament. Fourthly, the Conference should recommend that nuclear-weapon States review their military doctrines in order to reduce the importance and role of nuclear weapons. Fifthly, the Conference should secure a commitment from nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons as a first step in a process leading to the negotiation of a convention banning their production and use. Sixthly, the Conference should ask the nuclear-weapon States to carry out, within an agreed time frame and in transparent and internationally verifiable conditions, additional measures aimed at the destruction of their nuclear arsenals. Lastly, the Conference should reiterate the need for comprehensive, systematic and regular reports to be submitted as official documents of the Conference by the nuclear-weapon States regarding their implementation of article VI.

74. **Mr. Kharazi** (Islamic Republic of Iran), introducing working paper NPT/CONF.2005/WP.47, entitled, "Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran for Main Committee I", drew attention to a paragraph in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)) which reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The 2000 Review had also agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It had called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on that subject, but unfortunately the Preparatory Committee had not been able to do so. His delegation therefore proposed the establishment of an ad hoc committee to draft a legally binding instrument on the provision of negative security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The Committee would submit a report on that instrument to the next Review Conference for consideration. As suggested by the NGO community, the present Conference should adopt a decision to prohibit the threat of use or use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States.

75. His delegation was disappointed and dismayed that the United States of America, rather than focusing on the efforts of his Government to fulfil the obligations undertaken under the Treaty, had levelled false accusations against it which completely contradicted the reports and decisions of the IAEA and its Board of Governors. No IAEA document referred to non-compliance with the NPT. On the contrary, the IAEA had concluded in one of its main documents that, following extensive inspections of all relevant nuclear facilities in the country, it had found no trace of the diversion of nuclear material to non-peaceful uses. His delegation regretted that the representative of the United States had denied that it had any obligations under article VI of the Treaty and had used every possible forum during the Conference to make politically motivated accusations against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/SR.2

2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

19 June 2006

Original: English

Main Committee I

Summary record of the 2nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 19 May 2005, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Parnohadiningrat ..... (Indonesia)

Contents

General exchange of views (*continued*)

Introduction of subsidiary body by its Chairman

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent *within one week of the date of this document* to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza.

Any corrections to the record of this meeting and of other meetings will be issued in a corrigendum.

06-30674 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3 p.m.

General exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Ms. Martinic** (Argentina) said that her delegation welcomed the progress achieved regarding the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, the international climate had changed dramatically over the past five years, and the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference had been undermined by attempts to blur the meaning of the commitments made.

2. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty and the subsequent disclosure that it possessed nuclear weapons had been two of the most unfortunate events ever faced by the Review Conference process. The international community must respond decisively to the development of nuclear weapons outside the Treaty and to instances of non-compliance, and the Security Council should demonstrate stronger commitment in that regard.

3. With regard to the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the Treaty, agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, her delegation was concerned at the lack of progress made in the implementation of steps one, three, four, five and seven. Moreover, nine years after its adoption the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had still not entered into force because certain countries had not yet ratified it. Argentina was also concerned that the Conference on Disarmament had still not begun negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).

4. Argentina welcomed the common position of the Council of the European Union, set forth in document NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/WP.1, calling upon nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm existing security assurances contained in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and to sign and ratify the relevant protocols on nuclear-weapon-free zones.

5. Her delegation wished to draw attention to the role of the New Agenda Coalition in reminding States parties of the threat posed to international security by tactical weapons and of the need to incorporate such weapons in disarmament and arms-control agreements. In that regard, Argentina regretted the development of new security doctrines that failed to exclude the use of nuclear weapons.

6. Argentina hoped that the Review Conference would lead to the strengthening of reporting and transparency, a clear mandate for the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and a renewed commitment on the part of the five nuclear Powers to arms control and disarmament. It also trusted that the Review Conference would be conducted in an atmosphere of openness, dialogue and cooperation, aimed at achieving consensus.

7. **Mr. Agam** (Malaysia), speaking on behalf of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Timor-Leste and Yemen, introduced a working paper entitled "Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*: Legal, technical and political elements required for the establishment and maintenance of a nuclear weapon-free world" (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.41).

8. **Ms. Camejo** (Cuba) said that her delegation wished to associate itself with the statement made by the representative of Malaysia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty. Although the Treaty was regarded in many quarters as an end in itself, Cuba saw it as just one step along the road to nuclear disarmament. No State or group of States could claim a monopoly on the possession of nuclear weapons, and there was certainly no legitimate reason for the further development of such weapons by the exclusive club of five nuclear-weapon States.

9. The only way to overcome the Treaty's fundamental flaws was to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby guaranteeing the security of all peoples. As a State party to the Treaty, Cuba would continue to assert that the application of the principle of non-proliferation was not sufficient to eliminate nuclear weapons. Only the application of a systematic approach, which included the components of disarmament, verification, assistance and cooperation, could guarantee their total elimination.

10. Although the Treaty clearly aimed to achieve nuclear disarmament, the lack of concrete progress in implementing its article VI was a matter of profound concern. Nuclear-weapon States were primarily responsible for its implementation, and Cuba deeply regretted the failure to make concrete progress in the implementation of most of the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Some of those steps had become impracticable because of the unilateral action of the world's premier nuclear Power.

11. Cuba had long advocated the establishment of a committee on nuclear disarmament within the Conference on Disarmament and the immediate start of negotiations on a phased programme for the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific period of time, including the development of a nuclear-weapons convention. Moreover, Cuba called for the immediate start of negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty that banned the production of fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. It was essential that such a treaty should include not only non-proliferation measures but also nuclear-disarmament measures.

12. Cuba deeply regretted the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to make concrete progress in fulfilling their unequivocal commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Since the 2000 Review Conference, the process had been marked by a number of serious setbacks. The five nuclear-weapon States mentioned in the Treaty together possessed more than 21,000 nuclear weapons. The decision of the United States to withdraw unilaterally from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and to begin preparations for the deployment of a new national missile defence system had very negative implications for disarmament and arms control and was a regrettable setback to nuclear-disarmament efforts.

13. Cuba noted the commitments made by the Russian Federation and the United States in 2002 to reduce their stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Those commitments should be formalized through a legally binding instrument guaranteeing that the measures adopted would be irreversible and verifiable. The United States and the Russian Federation should resume the implementation of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty) and conclude negotiations on a future START III Treaty. They should also work together on a programme for the control of their non-strategic nuclear weapons by formalizing and verifying the related measures adopted by the two States in 1991 and 1992.

14. The nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT should ensure the non-operational status of their nuclear arsenals and their simultaneous and irreversible reduction and should begin negotiations on a legally binding international instrument by which they guaranteed not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

15. The most effective way to ensure that weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, were not used by terrorists was to secure their total elimination. Moreover, such concerns should be addressed within the framework of the existing international instruments on disarmament and non-proliferation and the relevant international treaties and institutions, notably the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

16. The imposition of selective, non-transparent mechanisms outside the framework of the United Nations and international treaties was not the proper response to international terrorism or to the link between international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The so-called Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) therefore undermined the international unity that should exist with regard to non-proliferation and the fight against terrorism, and it in effect sought to supplant the United Nations and the relevant existing international treaties and intergovernmental agencies. Moreover, in its conception and application, the PSI was a violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

17. The 2005 Review Conference offered an excellent framework within which to reaffirm and build upon the unequivocal commitment made by nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner. It also offered an opportunity for all States parties to the Treaty to adopt new measures towards that end.

18. **Mr. Heinsberg** (Germany) said that German policy remained focused on achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. There was general agreement on the final goal of the nuclear-disarmament process, which was to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. That goal had been made explicit in the principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The Treaty had faced several serious challenges since 1995 with respect to non-compliance with the Treaty's non-proliferation provisions, and the Review Conference would have to address those issues carefully.

19. However, the situation regarding new opportunities in nuclear disarmament had not changed since 1995, and full use of those opportunities should continue to be made. First, the Conference should strongly reaffirm its commitment to implement the decisions taken at the 1995

Review and Extension Conference and in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference with respect to nuclear disarmament. The 13 practical steps must remain the benchmark for further progress in that regard. Second, the Conference should acknowledge that the total elimination of nuclear weapons could not be achieved in one step and should endorse the concept of a step-by-step approach as already enshrined in the 13 practical steps. There should be common agreement on the concept of an incremental approach which would gradually lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Third, the Conference should, while recognizing the progress already made towards disarmament since the end of the cold war, underline the need to create a new momentum in efforts to achieve their total elimination.

20. One of the most important steps was to restore the process of the Conference on Disarmament, which was the sole permanent multilateral body for disarmament negotiations and which should be brought rapidly back to work. The unblocking of the Conference would represent a visible sign of a willingness to continue the global nuclear disarmament process in a decisive manner. The seriousness of any decisions taken by the Review Conference would otherwise be jeopardized.

21. Germany remained particularly committed to the early entry into force of the CTBT and called on all States that had not yet done so — especially those whose ratification was necessary to its entry into force — to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay. In the meantime Germany expected the nuclear-weapon States to maintain their moratoriums on nuclear testing and also expected China rapidly to introduce its own moratorium. There should be no doubt that nuclear testing was a thing of the past.

22. The next important step towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals was the rapid start of negotiations on an FMCT, without preconditions. Germany had from the outset supported the objective of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable and verifiable cut-off treaty. The further reduction in the number of substrategic or tactical nuclear weapons should be pursued on the basis of a step-by-step approach. The complete implementation of the respective unilateral commitments made by the Russian Federation and the United States in 1991 and 1992 should be a first step in that regard and should be followed by agreed transparency measures leading to the formalization and verification of those unilateral commitments.

23. It was irrelevant to discuss when a nuclear-weapon-free world could be achieved. Instead, the Review Conference should devote all its efforts to making continued, sustained progress towards that end, and there should be no room for doubt that the world was moving irreversibly forward.

24. **Mr. Benryane** (Morocco), after associating himself with the statement made by the representative of Malaysia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty, said that States parties to the Treaty must recognize that the crisis affecting the non-proliferation regime was due largely to the paralysis of the main disarmament mechanisms. By honouring their commitments under the Treaty, all States parties, especially the nuclear Powers, would give the non-proliferation regime more credibility.

25. Morocco, like all States parties to the Treaty, attached great importance to the valuable and considerable progress made at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and at the 2000 Review Conference. The Committee should therefore seek to reaffirm the full support of all States parties to the commitments made at those conferences and determine ways and means to achieve general and complete disarmament. In that context, Morocco wished to reiterate its desire for the rapid entry into force of the CTBT and the opening of negotiations on an FMCT.

26. The international community should, through the transparent and irreversible implementation of all relevant international instruments, reduce the role played by nuclear weapons in the definition of security policies and ensure that nuclear energy was used for peaceful purposes only. His delegation also wished to support the establishment, within the Committee, of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances.

27. **Mr. Paulsen** (Norway) said that his delegation wished to underline the importance of the principles and objectives adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and to reaffirm the relevance of the concrete, systematic steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Although considerable progress had been made since the end of the cold war, there were still far too many nuclear weapons in the world and those that were insufficiently protected could fall into the wrong hands. Irreversible cuts were therefore in the interests of all parties.

28. Norway had welcomed the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty") as an

important contribution to stability and to disarmament. However, it had also urged the Russian Federation and the United States to make deeper cuts, and to do so on the basis of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability. The 2000 Review Conference had called for further reductions in the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons and for the gradual codification of the relevant presidential initiatives of 1991 and 1992.

29. Nuclear disarmament was about more than simply reducing the number of nuclear weapons. It also required that the development of new types of weapons should be curbed. His delegation therefore wished to see the rapid entry into force of the CTBT and had urged all countries to ratify it as soon as possible. Pending its entry into force the nuclear-weapon States must adhere to their unilateral test moratoriums, and the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization must be given adequate funding.

30. An FMCT would have a positive impact on non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. However, a future cut-off treaty must also address the question of existing stocks, and Norway urged all nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under the IAEA verification regime.

31. Transparency was essential to effective nuclear disarmament, and reporting was a clear obligation. Norway therefore welcomed the regular reports provided by the nuclear-weapon States and looked forward to their continuation during the next review cycle. Legally binding negative security assurances would diminish the role played by nuclear weapons in national security policies, and his delegation therefore hoped that the Review Conference would reaffirm the provisions of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and make further progress towards achieving such legally binding assurances.

32. Lastly, he recalled that Norway had introduced a working paper (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.23), entitled "NPT — a dynamic instrument and core pillar of international security", which addressed issues of great relevance to the Committee. He therefore hoped that it would be taken into consideration in the Committee's report.

33. **Mr. Reimaa** (Finland) said that the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, including the agreed common position on non-strategic weapons, had been encouraging. Moreover, the working papers, statements and discussions of delegations during the present Review Conference had demonstrated recognition of the need for serious and substantial deliberations. Finland supported many of the positions raised in those various contributions and wished to associate itself in particular with the statement made by Luxembourg on behalf of the European Union.

34. The presidential declarations made by the Russian Federation and the United States in 1991 and 1992 had created a basis for unilateral reductions in nuclear-weapons stockpiles. Although subsequent statements had strengthened expectations that the declarations would be fulfilled, that had not yet proved to be the case. It was regrettable that the dismantling of tactical weapons had not taken place in line with the joint goals set forth at the 2000 Review Conference. The two parties concerned had specific obligations, and also very special responsibilities, to increase the openness of the process as a confidence-building measure.

35. The present global security situation demonstrated the need for closer international cooperation and underlined the importance of fighting against the threat of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic weapons. It was to be hoped that the present review process would lead to stronger measures and efforts, not only in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament, but also in the fight against terrorism and in nuclear safety. The issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons must be considered in all its aspects.

36. **Mr. Asmady** (Indonesia) said that the 2000 Review Conference had produced an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons, leading to nuclear disarmament, and the adoption of the 13 practical steps had provided a road map for achieving that objective. Taken together with article VI of the Treaty, those two decisions had provided an essential basis for ridding the world of the threat of nuclear weapons. The lack of a discernible shift in the positions of the nuclear-weapon States on that critical issue had led to a growing pessimism.

37. Past legal and political commitments were being treated as matters of political convenience rather than as binding obligations. It was unlikely that the CTBT would enter into force in the foreseeable future, although it remained an indispensable goal. The logical next step — the start of negotiations on an FMCT — had yet to become a reality. Moreover, it was unlikely that the Conference on Disarmament would soon establish subsidiary bodies to deal with that subject or the subject of nuclear disarmament.

38. States parties were faced with an unsustainable arms-control agenda which focused on non-proliferation rather than on nuclear disarmament. Problems relating to irreversibility, accountability and verifiability remained. There was no doubt that the nuclear-weapon States had the solemn obligation to dismantle their nuclear arsenals at an early date. That obligation was not subject to self-serving and casuistic interpretations. The failure to comply fully with Treaty obligations had undermined the credibility of the non-proliferation regime, and efforts should be made to build equitable regimes that addressed the legitimate needs of those non-nuclear-weapon States that had fulfilled their commitments.

39. None of the 13 practical steps had been implemented, and some had been totally ignored. They should be pursued because they would reduce the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons, address the concern of all States to agree on a legally binding international convention against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons, encourage the observance of international law and establish a mechanism for the implementation of nuclear-disarmament obligations within the agreed time frame, thus restoring the Treaty's viability and effectiveness.

40. All nuclear and related issues should be addressed at the same time. They were global problems which required multifaceted solutions, achieved under multilateral auspices. The three non-signatory States had, to varying degrees, undermined the Treaty-based regime, thus highlighting the need for de facto nuclear-weapon States to accept their obligations with respect to non-proliferation. The concept of reporting should also be developed at the Review Conference as an institutional component of the Treaty.

41. States parties to the Treaty would then be able to reach the appropriate conclusions regarding current and future nuclear-weapons policies and plans. The linkage between non-proliferation, disarmament and education was particularly urgent in the present very worrying international security climate, and would therefore require a sustained response from national Governments, international organizations and civil society.

42. **Mr. Park** In-kook (Republic of Korea) said that the disarmament obligations of nuclear-weapon States, as set forth in article VI of the Treaty, were fundamental to the Treaty's full implementation. The unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals was among the Treaty's key commitments.

43. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing components of the Treaty's implementation. Nuclear-weapon States should therefore attach the same importance to disarmament as they attached to the Treaty's other two pillars: non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While pursuing their non-proliferation commitments, nuclear-weapon States must simultaneously take steps towards disarmament. By doing so they would enhance their moral authority to deter potential proliferators.

44. Respective national, regional and global security environments were important factors in determining the nature and characteristics of nuclear disarmament, since different environments often called for different approaches. In that context his delegation supported practical steps towards the systematic and gradual achievement of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, it was imperative that the international community should foster a favourable environment for that process, preferably through a combination of unilateral, bilateral, multilateral and global initiatives.

45. While his delegation welcomed the progress made thus far by nuclear-weapon States in reducing their nuclear stockpiles, and also welcomed their commitments to further reductions, it expected them to make good on their promises. There was a growing gap in the perceptions of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States concerning the implementation of disarmament obligations. Narrowing that gap would enhance the moral authority and political legitimacy of nuclear-weapon States.

46. In that regard his delegation wished to underscore the need to implement faithfully the principles and objectives adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. It was essential that the CTBT should enter into force at an early date, and those States that had not yet signed or ratified that Treaty — especially those States whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force — should do so without delay. In the meantime it was imperative to maintain the moratoriums on nuclear testing.

47. Furthermore, negotiations on an FMCT should begin as soon as possible and should be rapidly concluded. In the meantime, his delegation called on all nuclear-weapon States and non-Treaty States to declare

and abide by a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear-weapons purposes. The Conference on Disarmament should resume its work as soon as possible, and nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate enhanced accountability and transparency in fulfilling their disarmament obligations.

48. Nuclear-weapon States should report their disarmament progress to the international community on a regular basis, and non-nuclear weapon States should also report on their nuclear stockpiles and inventories. However, given the current divergence of views on the modalities for reporting, there should be a degree of flexibility. Non-proliferation efforts, which should be strengthened and enhanced, would be most effective if they addressed the root causes of proliferation.

49. The best way to prevent proliferation was to eliminate incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons while ensuring that nuclear arsenals were ultimately negative to the security interests of the proliferators. His delegation supported the concept of negative security assurances and believed that nuclear-weapon States should provide strong and credible assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that were in compliance with their obligations regarding safeguards. There was also value in providing enhanced security assurances and other incentives to States parties that voluntarily accepted additional non-proliferation commitments.

50. Lastly, he wished to draw to the Committee's attention his Government's working paper, which was entitled "Views on substantive issues of the 2005 Review Conference" and was contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.42.

51. **Mr. Freeman** (United Kingdom) said that the United Kingdom had always been committed to the ultimate goal of verifiable nuclear disarmament, and it remained so. It had played a full role in achieving consensus on the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and continued to support the relevant disarmament measures contained both in that document and in the decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

52. Over the past 12 years the United Kingdom had made substantial progress with regard to its global nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty. It was the only nuclear-weapon State to have reduced its nuclear arsenal to a single nuclear-weapon system, and it had effectively reduced the explosive power of its nuclear weapons by 70 per cent since the end of the cold war.

53. Since 2000 the United Kingdom had also been pursuing a programme to develop expertise in verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons internationally. The overall aim of its research programme was to examine and test potential methodologies for use in a future nuclear-disarmament verification regime. The work was part of the United Kingdom's commitment to meeting the requirements of the Treaty's disarmament provisions and should be seen in the context of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

54. The latest results of the research programme had been published as a working paper of the Review Conference, contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.1. The United Kingdom would continue its research and would explore the possibility of exchanges with other countries.

55. The United Kingdom was committed to the maximum degree of transparency concerning its nuclear and fissile material stockpiles, in accordance with its national security requirements. It had halted the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. It welcomed the fact that several other nuclear-weapon States had taken the same step, and called on other States, including States that were not parties to the Treaty, to follow that example. The United Kingdom had been the first State voluntarily to declare the total size of its stockpiles. It had voluntarily placed all fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under international safeguards and remained committed to transparency with respect to fissile material.

56. The United Kingdom continued to support the negotiation of an FMCT and had been working actively in the Conference on Disarmament to draw up a programme of work agreeable to all parties. It had signed and ratified the CTBT and remained firmly committed to it. It had not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1991, and its commitment had been demonstrated by its continued support for the CTBT Organization and its activities. The United Kingdom welcomed the increase in the number of States parties to the CTBT and urged all other States to sign and ratify the CTBT as soon as possible.

57. He wished to reaffirm the United Kingdom's positive and negative security assurances. The United

Kingdom also fully supported the principle of nuclear-weapon-free zones and played an active and constructive role in their development. It continued to work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to produce an agreed protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok and hoped that ASEAN would continue consultations with the nuclear-weapon States. It also supported the proposal for a weapon-free zone in Central Asia and believed that the way forward was to make further progress with the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and protocols.

58. The United Kingdom had thus made significant progress towards the goals set forth in article VI of the Treaty, but also continued to encourage mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in the number of nuclear weapons worldwide. When the United Kingdom was satisfied that sufficient progress had been made (for example, through further deep cuts in the nuclear forces of the Russian Federation and the United States) to make it possible to include its nuclear weapons in any multilateral negotiations without endangering its security interests, it would do so. In that context, it warmly welcomed the entry into force, in 2003, of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions between the Russian Federation and the United States.

59. **Mr. Dolgov** (Russian Federation), emphasizing the firm commitment of the Russian Federation to disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, said that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons must be achieved step by step, using a comprehensive approach involving all the nuclear-weapon States, and in a manner which preserved strategic stability. Key steps towards that goal were the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), which had entered into force indefinitely on 1 June 1988, and the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), which had entered into force on 5 December 1994, following the removal of all the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union to the territory of the Russian Federation, and the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. The Russian Federation had fulfilled, and in some cases exceeded, its obligations under the INF and START I Treaties. Since the previous Review Conference alone, the Russian Federation had eliminated over 350 launchers and reduced total warhead numbers to 1,740.

60. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, which had entered into force on 1 June 2003 and had been hailed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 57/68 and 59/94, was a substantial advance in nuclear disarmament. The President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, had reaffirmed repeatedly the willingness of the Russian Federation to continue reducing its strategic nuclear arsenal even further.

61. The Russian Federation had cut back the number of tactical nuclear weapons to less than a quarter of the total inherited from the former Soviet Union and would continue to reduce its stock. Remaining weapons from all over the former Soviet Union had been collected at central storage sites in the Russian Federation to ensure their physical and technical safety and integrity. Comprehensive plans had been developed and implemented to prevent terrorist action involving nuclear sites. As an example, the armed forces and the Federal Atomic Energy Agency had held a large-scale exercise in the Murmansk *oblast* in August 2004, with 48 observers from 17 States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in attendance. The exercise had given the international community an accurate picture of the arrangements for secure storage and transportation of nuclear weapons in the Russian Federation and of rapid-reaction teams' high state of preparedness to cope with unforeseen incidents. The transparent conduct of a sensitive exercise demonstrated the effectiveness of the Russian Federation's action to keep nuclear weapons secure. In addition, it was methodically fulfilling its treaty obligations to cut back and destroy conventional and chemical weapons, at considerable financial cost.

62. The Government of the Russian Federation encouraged efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world as a step towards meeting new challenges and threats, consolidating nuclear non-proliferation measures, building confidence between States, boosting international stability and security and helping to sustain the momentum of global and regional disarmament. It placed great value on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and hoped for its rapid entry into force, despite the current slow pace of ratification. As part of its progress towards nuclear disarmament, the Russian Federation had considerably altered the structure of its weapons sector. On the grounds that output capacity exceeded defence needs, it had been halved. The production of uranium for weapons had long since been halted, while the graphite-moderated

reactors which had produced weapons-grade plutonium were being shut down with the assistance of the United States of America, and a commitment had been made to make the plutonium in question unusable for weapons. Finally, the Russian Federation continued to oppose the placing of any kind of weapon in space, as doing so would seriously threaten international stability and security and arms-control efforts. The risk of a new arms race, either in space or on earth, and the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, must be countered. To that end, the Russian Federation had joined China and other States in proposing an international agreement to prevent the stationing of weapons in space. It called on all States with space programmes to join such efforts.

63. **Mr. Trezza** (Italy) said that Italy supported the objectives set forth in article VI of the Treaty and would encourage good-faith negotiations on effective measures for the early cessation of the nuclear arms race, on nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Italy, together with its partners in the European Union, looked forward to further systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

64. Italy had finalized its report on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and on paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Review Conference decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Although much remained to be done to achieve nuclear disarmament, the progress already achieved should not be minimized or dismissed.

65. He wished to note that the delegation of Luxembourg had submitted, on behalf of the European Union, a working paper entitled "European Union common approach: Cooperative Threat Reduction — Global Partnership Initiative", contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.37.

66. The significant reductions made in nuclear weapons stocks over recent decades, through multilateral, bilateral and unilateral treaties and processes, had shown the international community that disarmament negotiations were meaningless unless the weapons involved were either physically destroyed or disposed of appropriately. Over the past decade many countries had worked together under the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative to secure and dismantle nuclear, biological and chemical weapons materials, carriers and infrastructure. Those efforts had culminated in the Global Partnership agreed by the leaders of the Group of Eight (G-8) countries in June 2002.

67. At a time when nuclear proliferation was becoming a growing threat to international peace and security, and in view of the risk that terrorists might seek to possess fissile material or nuclear weapons, the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative should be seen as a new way to address the problem of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It strengthened trust between States and facilitated the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the Treaty. It also accelerated the nuclear-weapons reduction process and facilitated accession to the Treaty, thereby strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

68. In conclusion, Italy fully supported the invitation of the European Union presidency to "recognize the importance, from the point of view of nuclear disarmament, of the programmes for the destruction and the elimination of nuclear weapons and the elimination of fissile material as defined under the G-8 Global Partnership" and wished that language to be included in the Final Document of the Review Conference.

69. **Ms. Hobbs** (New Zealand), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that the objective of the Coalition at the Review Conference was the achievement of real progress towards nuclear disarmament. In that regard she would draw the Committee's attention to three documents which outlined essential elements of the Coalition's position: the text of the statement made to the plenary Review Conference by New Zealand on behalf of the Coalition; the working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the Coalition, contained in document NPT/CONF.2005/WP.27, entitled "Working paper on nuclear disarmament for Main Committee I"; and the New Agenda Coalition's working paper on security assurances, originally submitted to the second Preparatory Committee as document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.11. The Coalition would be drawing on those papers and making contributions on specific subjects throughout the Review Conference.

70. **Mr. Streuli** (Switzerland) said that Switzerland supported all multilateral disarmament and arms-control initiatives aimed at achieving concrete and verifiable results. It attached particular importance to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty as well as to respect for the commitments that had led to the signing of the Treaty by States that had agreed to renounce their

own nuclear ambitions in return for commitments by nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament.

71. The vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States parties had respected their commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear-weapon States should continue to work towards the gradual fulfilment of their obligations. Since the last Review Conference there had been positive developments. The Moscow Treaty, for example, would produce a significant reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and should therefore be welcomed as a step in the right direction.

72. However, in order to be credible, any bilateral or unilateral disarmament measure should adopt the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability. Whereas the implementation of non-proliferation measures was subject to the IAEA multilateral verification regime, nuclear-disarmament measures were not subject to any verifiable multilateral regime. In that regard, he welcomed the studies conducted by the United Kingdom in the area of verification. In the field of non-strategic nuclear weapons, progress remained somewhat mixed. There was a significant disparity between promises made on a unilateral basis and their effective implementation.

73. His delegation supported all the commitments made in the Final Documents adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference. Together, the two documents constituted a set of established laws and practices which underpinned the credibility and value of the Treaty as the cornerstone of international security. His delegation wished to emphasize in particular the need to respect the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament principles and objectives agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. However, it should be noted that not all the decisions taken at that Conference a decade earlier had yet been implemented. He therefore called on the States concerned to assume their related responsibilities.

74. In that regard, his delegation wished to make a number of points. First, in order to safeguard the CTBT it was essential that States whose ratification was necessary for its entry into force should proceed to ratify it as soon as possible. In the meantime, they should maintain their moratoriums on nuclear testing. Second, a special committee should be set up within the Conference on Disarmament, aimed at facilitating the opening of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. His delegation shared the view that States which produced fissile materials for military purposes should introduce a moratorium on the production of such materials and place existing stocks under IAEA control.

75. Third, the negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty remained inadequate because they were generally accompanied by reservations. Regardless of whether they belonged to a nuclear-weapon-free zone, non-nuclear-weapon States parties had a legitimate right to security assurances against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. His delegation therefore requested that, in accordance with the recommendations contained in the principles and objectives agreed in 1995, a binding multilateral instrument on security assurances should be negotiated within the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, it welcomed the efforts made by Mexico to that end.

76. The 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference also constituted a set of established laws and practices, and it was a matter of regret that only limited overall progress had been made towards their implementation. His delegation would support any proposals reaffirming the unequivocal commitment of States parties to the 13 steps, and urged the Review Conference to focus on strengthening some of the steps. In that context, it welcomed the proposals made by Canada on the implementation of article VI, and would note that it had submitted its own report on the same subject.

77. Unfortunately, the achievement of the nuclear disarmament goals set forth in article VI of the Treaty remained a very distant prospect. The Final Document of the Review Conference should therefore contain a strong message reiterating the need for all States parties to respect all their Treaty obligations. Switzerland expected nuclear-weapon States parties to make a new and unequivocal commitment to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

78. **Mr. Smith** (Australia) said that his country remained committed to a nuclear-weapon-free world. As one of the vast majority of States parties to the Treaty that had forsworn nuclear weapons, it expected the nuclear-weapon States vigorously to pursue their disarmament commitments under the Treaty. Australia had joined Japan in putting forward ideas for further progress on nuclear disarmament, which had been circulated as working paper NPT/CONF.2005/WP.34 entitled "Further

measures to be taken to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime".

79. It was also important to recognize the substantial progress made in the area of nuclear disarmament. A major development since the 2000 Review Conference had been the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. The reductions contemplated under that agreement were significant and undeniable. However, the two States should continue their efforts to reduce strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons in both deployed and reserve holdings.

80. Australia also wished to acknowledge the nuclear disarmament steps taken by the United Kingdom and France. The fact that American and Russian nuclear arsenals were many times larger did not excuse nuclear-weapon States with smaller arsenals from honouring their commitments under the Treaty. The significance of the Treaty lay not just in its quantitative reductions but also in its having established a more cooperative arms-control relationship between the two main nuclear Powers.

81. Australia welcomed the steps taken to reduce the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems, including de-targeting and reducing the alert status of certain nuclear-weapon systems. It looked to the nuclear-weapon States to pursue further reductions in the operational status of nuclear-weapon systems in ways that promoted international stability and security.

82. As long as the nuclear-weapon States continued to possess nuclear weapons, they had a responsibility to ensure that their nuclear-weapon policies did not detract from the global non-proliferation norm. Otherwise, the Treaty's basic foundation might be eroded. In particular, nuclear-weapon States must ensure a reduced role for nuclear weapons in their national security policies.

83. A key outcome of the 2000 Review Conference was that the principle of irreversibility should apply to nuclear disarmament. Australia recognized that progress had been made on irreversibility, and also welcomed the work being done by the United Kingdom on means of verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Effective verification would be central to irreversible nuclear disarmament.

84. All States parties must demonstrate their commitment to practical steps to facilitate nuclear disarmament. Australia placed particular importance on the entry into force of the CTBT. It should not be forgotten that the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS) delivered real security and other benefits, including a possible role in a global tsunami warning system. The Review Conference should urge those countries that had yet to sign or ratify the CTBT to do so as soon as possible. Until the CTBT entered into force, existing moratoriums on nuclear testing must be maintained, and strong support should continue to be given to development of the IMS.

85. Capping the amount of fissile material available for nuclear weapons was an essential step towards irreversible nuclear disarmament. And yet, negotiations on an FMCT had still not begun because of the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament. The failure of the Conference on Disarmament to fulfil its mandate in that regard raised doubts as to its usefulness as an effective disarmament forum. The Review Conference must serve as a catalyst for an immediate start to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and to its early conclusion. To be credible and effective, such a treaty should include appropriate measures to verify that parties were complying with their obligations.

86. Australia welcomed the moratorium introduced by most nuclear-weapon States on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It hoped that China would join the other nuclear-weapon States in announcing its own moratorium and would urge India, Pakistan and Israel to do the same.

87. Australia placed great importance on nuclear-weapon-free zones as a vehicle for providing binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Over the past decade the signing by nuclear-weapon States of the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones had increased the number of non-nuclear-weapon States benefiting from legally binding negative security assurances, and, in cases where nuclear-weapon States had not yet signed or ratified such protocols, Australia encouraged discussions aimed at enabling them to do so.

88. Universality remained essential to the full realization of the Treaty's objectives, and while it was certainly a long-term goal, it was not unattainable. History had shown that nuclear proliferation was reversible. Pending their accession to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, the non-Treaty States — India, Pakistan and Israel — should refrain from taking actions contrary to the universal norms embodied in the Treaty. In particular, they must support the global nuclear non-

proliferation norm by ensuring that strict domestic controls were kept on their nuclear materials, equipment, technology and knowledge.

89. The non-Treaty States should also support practical progress on nuclear disarmament, and it was a matter of concern that India and Pakistan had not yet signed the CTBT and that Israel had not yet ratified it. For each of those countries the CTBT was an opportunity to take a significant confidence-building measure in a region of tension.

90. It should never be forgotten that the Treaty played a central role in maintaining global peace and security, even while nuclear disarmament remained a work in progress. Furthermore, it should always be acknowledged that nuclear disarmament could not be considered in isolation from other aspects of the Treaty or from the wider international security environment. Movement on nuclear disarmament should not be a precondition for further improvements to the non-proliferation regime.

91. **The Chairman** said that he had been approached by the representative of China, who wished to exercise his country's right of reply under rule 19 of the rules of procedure of the Review Conference.

92. **Mr. Hu** Xiaodi (China) said that he wished to clarify his delegation's position in the light of the statement made by the representative of Germany. China had in fact introduced a moratorium on nuclear testing many years ago. It had always firmly supported the CTBT and had actively participated in the relevant negotiations. As a nuclear-weapon State, and as one of the annex-II countries to the CTBT, China was well aware of its special responsibility to promote the Treaty's entry into force and to maintain its own test moratorium. The Chinese National People's Congress was presently reviewing the Treaty, in accordance with the relevant procedures. He therefore wished to stress, once again, that China had always honoured its commitment to its moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing, and would continue to do so.

Introduction of subsidiary body by its Chairman

93. **Mr. Caughley** (New Zealand) said that the subsidiary body would focus its work on nuclear disarmament and security assurances and would hold two meetings during the Review Conference, focusing on each topic in turn. He wished to encourage a dialogue and a certain degree of interactivity and fluidity in the subsidiary body's proceedings. If delegations wished to put forward proposals, he would encourage them to provide the Secretariat with written statements. Lastly, he would be open to receiving advice and to engaging in consultations, although delegations should try to focus on practical proposals.

94. **Mr. Zarif** (Islamic Republic of Iran) wondered whether the members of the subsidiary body would receive a preparatory text ahead of the two meetings, as such a text would greatly facilitate their discussions.

95. **Mr. Caughley** (New Zealand) said that he would prefer to listen to the various statements in the Main Committee before attempting to prepare such a text, although he would be guided by delegations' wishes in that regard.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.